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•  The collateral policy of central banks refl  ects 
two key objectives: to protect the central bank’s 
balance sheet from fi  nancial losses arising from 
counterparty default, and to support the central 
bank’s objectives for monetary policy and the 
fi  nancial system. 
•  Financial conditions may necessitate changes to 
central bank collateral policy. During the recent 
fi  nancial crisis, the temporary expansion of the 
range of acceptable collateral by central banks 
helped to support market and funding liquidity. 
•  The unique position of central banks in the fi  nan-
cial system provides them with an opportunity to 
use their collateral policy to encourage better risk-
management practices, including those related to 
the transparency of securitized products and the 
management of credit risk and market risk. 
O
ne of the salient features of the recent fi  nancial 
crisis was the drastic reduction in market and 
funding liquidity in core markets.
1 The ability to 
trade fi  nancial asset positions of reasonable size with 
little price impact (market liquidity) and the ability of 
solvent institutions to readily obtain immediate means 
of payment to meet liabilities coming due (funding 
liquidity) are essential for a safe and effi  cient fi  nancial 
system. The reduction in liquidity therefore threatened 
the stability of the fi  nancial system and reduced the 
effectiveness of the instruments that central banks 
traditionally use to conduct monetary policy 
(Cecchetti 2008). Major central banks acted to bolster 
liquidity and alleviate funding pressures, and their 
collateral policy played a critical role.
2 Central banks 
not only increased the amount of liquidity offered to 
the fi  nancial system,
3 but also expanded the list of 
collateral that would be accepted in exchange for 
central bank liquidity. This helped to counter the 
effects of the aggregate liquidity shock and eventually 
helped money and credit markets to function more 
normally.
This article examines central bank collateral policy 
and draws insights from the experience gained during 
the recent crisis. In formulating its collateral policy, a 
central bank is motivated not only by the traditional 
objective of protecting its balance sheet from fi  nancial 
losses, but also by its goals for monetary policy and 
the fi  nancial system. Balancing these objectives 
depends on the external environment; i.e., collateral 
1  A core funding market is one that (i) is an important source of funding for 
the institutions, market-makers, and governments at the centre of the 
fi  nancial system; (ii) constitutes a funding source for which there is no 
immediate substitute; and (iii) could channel signifi  cant contagion 
should it cease to function properly. See Fontaine, Selody and Wilkins 
(2009) and Carney (2008).
2  See Zorn, Wilkins and Engert (2009) for a full description of the 
extraordinary measures taken by the Bank of Canada over 2007–09 in 
response to the fi  nancial crisis.
3  See the article by Lavoie, Sebastian and Traclet on page 27.
*  Alejandro García is now with the Offi  ce of the Superintendent of
Financial Institutions.
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ordinary times. Central banks can also use their col-
lateral policy to positively infl  uence fi  nancial market 
practices, thereby contributing to monetary stability 
and the effi  ciency and stability of the fi  nancial system. 
We discuss three important areas in which central 
banks can contribute to global initiatives aimed at 
improving the risk-management practices of fi  nancial 
system participants: promoting greater transparency 
for securitized products; improving the practices 
related to managing credit risk; and reducing pro-
cyclicality in the management of market risk.
What Is Collateral Policy?
Collateral generally refers to assets pledged as 
security against loans. For the Bank of Canada this 
includes liquidity loans provided under the Standing 
Liquidity Facility (SLF) to support intra-day payments 
in and settlement of the Large Value Transfer System 
(LVTS),
4 as well as extraordinary lending that might be 
conducted during crisis periods.
5 
A central bank designs its collateral 
policy not only to manage its own risks,
but also in consideration of the broader 
impacts on the fi  nancial system
Collateral policy is the set of principles and rules 
governing the valuation, risk assessment, and accept-
ance of assets as security for lending transactions. It 
includes eligibility criteria for the types of assets that 
can be pledged, measures to control risk, and how 
the rules themselves may be changed in certain cir-
cumstances. Collateral policy affects individual trans-
actions among fi  nancial institutions and, thus, can 
have an impact on the entire fi  nancial system: collat-
eral helps to limit a lender’s losses in the event of a 
counterparty default; at a macro level, the collective 
results of individual collateral arrangements can affect 
the degree of overall market and funding liquidity. 
Understanding this, a central bank designs its collat-
eral policy not only to manage its own risks, but also 
in consideration of the broader impacts on the fi  nan-
cial system.
4  The LVTS is Canada’s large-value payments system.
5 This  defi  nition of collateral excludes securities that are eligible for repo 
operations, although the term is often used in this context.
Designing Collateral Policy
Central bank collateral policy can have more than one 
objective. First, as a public institution its collateral 
policy should preserve the value of the central bank’s 
fi  nancial assets. Second, it should support the central 
bank’s monetary policy and fi  nancial system respon-
sibilities. Central bank collateral policy directly affects 
liquidity in core funding markets and can indirectly 
infl  uence the relative pricing of credit risk and the 
level of credit intermediation in the economy. It can 
also affect money market dynamics and, therefore, 
the monetary policy transmission mechanism. 
Consequently, in setting its collateral policy, the 
central bank considers the requirements for well-
functioning markets, which in turn, support fi  nancial 
system stability and effi  ciency and the implementation 
of monetary policy.
The fi  rst objective is supported by reducing the prob-
ability of losses on the central bank’s collateral—
minimizing the risk of counterparty default, as well as 
minimizing losses arising from the market risk associ-
ated with the collateral pledged. The central bank 
deals only with selected, creditworthy counterparties 
and accepts only high-quality collateral in which it 
obtains a valid fi  rst-priority security interest. To control 
the risks inherent in the collateral itself, terms and 
conditions for accepting collateral are established, 
including applicable limits and haircuts.
6 
In jurisdictions with well-developed fi  nancial markets,
the central bank supports the second objective in 
accordance with the state of the fi  nancial system. In 
normal times, the central bank can promote fi  nancial 
system stability and effi  ciency in a market-neutral 
manner; i.e., there is no need or desire on the part of 
the central bank to interfere with market forces. But 
recent experience has demonstrated that the central 
bank may need to intervene during crisis periods, 
particularly those characterized by sharp, system-
wide reductions in market and funding liquidity.
7 In 
such exceptional times, the central bank may use 
elements of its collateral policy to counteract the 
negative effects that arise when market participants 
act to protect their own fi  nancial interests without 
considering or realizing the impact of their actions on 
6  Margins are the amount of collateral that must be deposited to cover the 
credit risk borne by the lender. The haircut determines the valuation of 
any asset pledged as collateral and is the discount applied to the 
current market value of the asset to refl  ect the uncertainty in its future 
value should the collateral need to be liquidated.
7  Central bank engagement may also be desirable when markets are 
developing and have not reached a level of maturity suffi  cient to allocate 
resources effi  ciently.
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8 This effect may be 
small and is especially diffi  cult to identify in normal 
times, because there are many participants, each 
acting differently and each action having only a small 
impact on aggregate risk. Under extraordinary cir-
cumstances, such as systemic shocks, however, 
market participants act in a more homogeneous 
manner, and the combined negative impact of their 
individual actions may be signifi  cant. 
A central bank’s collateral policy and 
related practices should be set out in
a clear, principles-based framework 
that allows some fl  exibility to address 
extraordinary circumstances
To facilitate the central bank’s ability to intervene 
when needed, its collateral policy and related prac-
tices should be set out in a clear, principles-based 
framework that allows some fl  exibility to address 
extraordinary circumstances.
9 In particular, the oper-
ational framework supporting the collateral policy 
should include risk-management and valuation 
methods that can accommodate new and/or complex 
assets. By temporarily accepting riskier collateral 
under an appropriate risk-mitigation strategy, the 
central bank can address any shortage of highest-
quality collateral and liquidity, thus helping to offset 
distortions in fi  nancial markets and re-establish 
market functioning. 
Changes to Central Bank 
Collateral Policy during the Crisis
During the recent fi  nancial crisis, market participants 
tightened the terms and conditions attached to 
secured lending transactions by restricting eligible 
collateral and increasing haircuts. In aggregate, these 
actions reduced funding and market liquidity and 
intensifi  ed market volatility. One way in which central 
banks responded was by expanding the list of assets 
acceptable as collateral so that counterparties had 
greater fl  exibility in accessing central bank funds. In 
order to address heightened pressures in short-term 
8  It is perfectly rational for a market participant to act in its own best 
interest, rather than contribute to the broader good at its own expense. 
9  Engert, Selody and Wilkins (2008) outline principles for central bank 
intervention in response to fi  nancial market turmoil.
funding markets, the Bank of Canada accelerated its 
decision-making process in the early stages of the 
crisis, so that U.S. Treasury securities and certain 
asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) were added 
more quickly to the list of assets permanently eligible 
as collateral under the SLF.
10 As the risk aversion of 
investors towards securitized products increased 
during the crisis, sponsoring banks were forced to 
take these securities back onto their balance sheets.
11 
To provide greater fl  exibility in managing collateral and 
to support efforts to generate liquidity, the Bank of 
Canada temporarily allowed sponsoring banks to 
pledge their own ABCP and applied a higher haircut. 
During the crisis, the Bank of Canada also began to 
accept assignment of the non-mortgage loan portfolio 
(NMLP) of banks as collateral.
12 Direct participants in 
the LVTS were able to substitute their NMLP in place 
of securities to cover their collateral requirements for 
the LVTS, the SLF, and the Term Loan Facility.
13 The 
Bank was willing to accept a pool of non-marketable, 
illiquid assets as collateral on a temporary basis, so 
that LVTS participants could use their conventional, 
liquid collateral elsewhere.
14 As funding conditions 
normalized, the eligible amount of the NMLP was 
gradually reduced. To support effi  ciency, the Bank 
maintained limited, permanent use of the NMLP as 
collateral and allows temporary lifting of the limit in 
extraordinary circumstances in order to accommo-
date extremely large payment fl  ows (Bank of Canada 
2009).
15 
Although a fl  exible collateral policy can help the cen-
tral bank to achieve its policy goals, this fl  exibility is 
accompanied by the risk of moral hazard; i.e., the 
expectation that the central bank will act in a similar 
fashion in the future may encourage more risk taking. 
More generally, the perception could prevail that 
10 ABCP had previously been eligible as collateral under a temporary 
liquidity facility established to support potential challenges arising from 
the year-2000 rollover (Bank of Canada 1999). The Bank was aware that 
acceptance of these securities would send an important signal to the 
market and, in turn, help to support the longer-term viability of the 
Canadian ABCP market.
11 The sponsoring bank, while not the legal issuer, typically supports the 
promotion, marketing and distribution of the securities, in addition to 
providing administrative services, liquidity support and/or credit support.
12 The NMLP had also been eligible as collateral under the temporary year-
2000 liquidity facility. 
13 Details on the Term Loan Facility can be found on the Bank of Canada 
website at <http://www.bankofcanada.ca>.
14 Risk was mitigated by limiting the collateral value of the NMLP to
60 per cent of the loan portfolio’s value, although, in practice, collateral 
needs were only a fraction of this amount. There was also a reasonable 
assurance of quality, given that pledging institutions were regulated by 
the Offi  ce of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions, with which the 
Bank of Canada has a close, formal relationship for the purposes of 
exchanging information relevant to the fi  nancial system. 
15 As of 1 April 2010, LVTS participants may use their NMLP for up to
20 per cent of their total collateral value.
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for market funding. Central banks need to emphasize 
that extraordinary actions are temporary and situation 
specifi  c. They must underscore the uncertainty sur-
rounding such events and that the central bank’s 
response to them is not guaranteed. Consequently, 
individual system participants should guard against 
the risk that they may suffer a loss if they inappropri-
ately incorporate an implicit guarantee of central bank 
intervention (Selody and Wilkins 2010). Clear com-
munication of the principles for intervention can help 
in this regard.
Central banks can also reduce the need to intervene 
in fi  nancial markets by encouraging individual actors 
in the fi  nancial system to be suffi  ciently resilient to 
shocks.
16 Encouraging the adoption of appropriate 
fi  nancial market practices is one way of achieving this.
Promoting Appropriate Market 
Practices
The Bank of Canada has always had an interest in the 
development of well-functioning fi  nancial markets that 
support the stability and effi  ciency of the fi  nancial 
system and, at various times, the Bank has taken an 
active role in improving market dynamics and practi-
ces.
17 Since the fi  nancial crisis, efforts have focused 
on behaviour that strengthens the fi  nancial system 
and prevents future crises. At the same time, the Bank 
of Canada and its peers have recognized that their 
unique role in the fi  nancial system provides them with 
the opportunity of using collateral policy to promote 
positive change.
Central bank liquidity is an important facet of the 
day-to-day functioning of the fi  nancial system, and 
private sector practices can be infl  uenced by dealings 
with a central bank. Given the increasing importance 
of collateral-based fi  nancing, the central bank can 
shape its collateral policy so that its counterparties, 
and by extension the broader marketplace, are 
encouraged to adopt appropriate practices in invest-
ment and collateral management, thereby contributing 
16 Many reforms currently under way are aimed at reducing the likelihood 
that central bank intervention will be required in the future. These 
include reforms aimed at increasing the amount and quality of capital 
and liquid assets held by fi  nancial institutions, as well as greater use of 
central counterparties in repo markets.
17 For example, during the 1950s and 1960s, the Bank of Canada’s market 
operations were designed to encourage the development of a Canadian 
money market; in the 1990s, the Bank worked with the fi  nancial industry 
to develop a code of conduct for the Government of Canada securities 
market; the Bank continues to be an active member of the Canadian 
Foreign Exchange Committee (CFEC), which aims to establish practices 
and procedures for the foreign exchange market. 
to well-functioning fi  nancial markets and a more 
stable and effi  cient fi  nancial system. Although central 
banks generally rely on market forces to set market 
standards, the incentives of the private sector are not 
always geared to developing or adopting best prac-
tices in a timely manner for the benefi  t of all. At such 
times, it may be benefi  cial for central banks to model 
appropriate practices. This has become evident in 
three areas: transparency for securitized products, the 
management of credit risk, and the management of 
market risk. 
The central bank can shape
its collateral policy to encourage
appropriate practices in investment
and collateral management, thereby 
contributing to a more stable and
effi  cient fi  nancial system
Transparency for securitized products
The availability of relevant and timely investment infor-
mation should benefi  t the quality of investor decision 
making and make it easier for investors to enforce 
market discipline, thereby improving overall market 
stability and effi  ciency. One of the many factors con-
tributing to the recent crisis was an inadequate under-
standing of risks, combined with too little due 
diligence by investors. This was particularly evident 
with respect to securitized products, for which suf-
fi  cient information was not readily available (Hendry, 
Lavoie and Wilkins 2010). Recognizing this short-
coming, the G-20 committed to improving the trans-
parency of these products, and regulators, as well as 
industry groups, have advanced a number of sup-
porting initiatives.
In December 2007, the Bank of Canada announced 
that it would develop eligibility requirements for 
accepting ABCP as collateral for the SLF that would 
include higher standards for disclosure (Bank of 
Canada 2008). This announcement indicated the 
Bank’s intention to contribute to a broader objective of 
greater transparency for securitized products. The 
announcement not only signalled the Bank of 
Canada’s view that securitization is important 
because it supports the allocation of credit, but also 
that fl  aws in the structure of securitized products and 
defi  ciencies in the disclosure of information were of 
concern. The Canadian ABCP market was hit during 
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of the risks associated with ABCP investments con-
tributed to the situation. When the terms and condi-
tions for acceptance of ABCP as collateral were fi  nally 
announced in March 2008, a large component was 
related to information disclosure.
18 Other stakeholders 
in the Canadian ABCP market have endeavoured to 
improve the availability of relevant investment 
information.
19
On an international basis, other central banks have 
contributed to enhanced transparency for securitized 
products through adjustments to their collateral poli-
cies. For example, in September 2008, the European 
Central Bank (ECB) refi  ned its eligibility requirements 
for asset-backed securities (ABS) accepted as collat-
eral in Eurosystem credit operations, specifying 
important investment details to be included in a pub-
licly available credit-rating report.
20 More recently, in 
December 2010, the ECB announced its intention to 
introduce loan-by-loan information requirements and 
to actively encourage a data-handling infrastructure to 
ensure that data are made available to market partici-
pants (ECB 2010). In November 2010, the Bank of 
England also set out details and implementation time-
lines for new transparency criteria for ABS and cov-
ered bonds accepted as collateral for the central 
bank’s liquidity facilities.
21 
Transparency initiatives for securitized products 
involve co-operation among market participants, 
industry groups, regulators and central banks and are 
ongoing as part of a broader set of initiatives geared 
towards strengthening this market.
22 Nevertheless, 
there is still a question as to how the transparency 
requirements of central banks should complement 
those of regulators. At the request of the Financial 
Stability Board (FSB) and the G-20, regulators are 
reviewing the need for rule changes related to 
18 The Bank’s transparency requirements for ABCP specify: a single, 
concise document provided by and validated by the sponsor, containing 
all relevant investment information; that is accessible to all investors; 
and timely notice of changes to the information contained in this 
document. Although the Bank provides guidelines on the information 
that it considers relevant, the onus is placed on the sponsor to 
determine what information is important for investors. 
19 For example, Dominion Bond Rating Service (DBRS) now publishes 
enhanced “Structured Finance Surveillance Reports” that allow for 
more thorough analyses of certain asset classes.
20 The initial report must include a comprehensive analysis of structural 
and legal aspects, a detailed analysis of the collateral pool, analysis of 
transaction participants, and any other particulars relevant to the 
transaction. Key transaction data and performance data are to be 
included in quarterly publications of ratings reviews.
21 Although primarily aimed at improving the effi  ciency of its risk 
management of ABS, the Bank of England has indicated that increased 
disclosure requirements will advance progress in market-wide 
transparency (Bank of England 2010a and 2010b).
22 See Allan and Bergevin (2010), IMF (2009), Paligorova (2009), Selody 
and Woodman (2009) for more on the reform of securitization markets.
disclosure for securitized products, but to date, there 
does not appear to be a common approach between 
central banks and regulators.
23 
Managing credit risk 
Understanding and evaluating the credit (or default)-
risk characteristics of assets accepted as collateral is 
an important component of risk management, and 
various tools are available. Credit-rating agencies 
(CRAs) provide an accessible, alternative source of 
opinion on credit risk, particularly if a market partici-
pant is unable to perform a complete, independent 
assessment. But lax credit-risk management and 
mechanistic reliance on CRA ratings can be problem-
atic for individual market participants and for the 
fi  nancial system. The recent crisis demonstrated how 
unforeseen and abrupt credit-rating downgrades can 
inadvertently increase fi  nancial system instability by 
triggering large-scale sell-offs and knock-on effects 
that exaggerate negative market impacts.
24 
This experience confi  rmed the need for credit-risk-
management practices to evolve so that the limita-
tions of CRA ratings are understood and other 
information is used to form a full, independent assess-
ment of credit risk. Action is required from both the 
public and private sector to reduce incentives for the 
mechanistic use of CRA ratings.
In October 2010, the FSB published a number of 
high-level principles to guide the public and private 
sectors in reducing their reliance on CRA ratings 
when making investment decisions and when 
developing standards, laws and regulations (FSB 
2010). The principles make specifi  c reference to cen-
tral bank collateral requirements. Central banks are 
encouraged to make their own judgments related to 
the credit risk of the fi  nancial instruments that they 
accept and to avoid mechanistic use of CRA ratings in 
their collateral policies.
25 The principles do recognize 
that central banks can use CRA ratings as one of a 
set of tools used to make such judgments, however. 
Indeed, if the central bank relied solely on its own 
judgment of credit risk, private sector behaviour could 
be infl  uenced by its decisions. By using a broad array 
23 On 25 March 2011, the Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA) 
published for comment proposed enhancements to transparency and 
disclosure requirements for securitized products. The CSA indicated 
that the proposed requirements were designed to be consistent with 
international developments.
24 The IMF has discussed the inadvertent contribution of rating agencies 
to fi  nancial instability, both before and after the crisis; e.g., IMF
(2008, 2009) and Kiff (2010). 
25 As stated in its collateral policy, the Bank of Canada retains the right of 
refusal for any asset presented as collateral, allowing for other relevant 
factors, in addition to CRA ratings, to be included in its judgment of
acceptability.
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tral bank could prompt its counterparties to also look 
beyond CRA ratings in making investment and collat-
eral decisions.
The Bank of Canada has made several adjustments to 
its collateral policy in order to better manage credit 
risk and to promote more prudent practices. When it 
fi  rst accepted ABCP as collateral in 2008, the Bank 
applied “stand-alone,” versus offi  cial, credit ratings as 
part of its credit-risk assessment of the bank spon-
sors of ABCP.
26 The Bank also instituted the require-
ment of at least two credit ratings to establish 
creditworthiness. In September 2010, this requirement 
was extended to all non-sovereign securities. Having 
more than one CRA rating provides the Bank and its 
counterparties with greater assurance that all the 
factors contributing to credit risk have been identifi  ed 
and evaluated. In addition, the second-highest credit 
rating is now used to establish eligibility, as well as to 
determine applicable haircuts. This approach limits 
incentives for issuers to shop around for the best 
rating, and the Bank avoids being seen as overly 
conservative or overly lenient when interpreting con-
fl  icting ratings. 
Other information may be employed when assessing 
credit risk, including market-based measures.
27 
Research at the Bank of Canada is examining the 
value of indexes for credit default swaps and data on 
expected default frequency as supplementary infor-
mation on credit risk.
28 Many central banks supple-
ment the requirement of a minimum CRA rating with 
market information and/or engage in full internal 
assessments of credit risk. Practices have evolved 
since the crisis and will likely continue to evolve in the 
coming years.  
Managing market risk 
Fluctuations in asset prices present the risk that an 
asset held as collateral will decline in value and that 
losses will be incurred in the event that a counterparty 
default forces the sale of that collateral. The applica-
tion of haircuts is an important element in managing 
this market risk.
26 Stand-alone credit ratings are those that do not incorporate implicit 
third-party fi  nancial support from a government. See Harvey and
Merkowsky (2008) for a discussion of stand-alone ratings.
27 For example, Moody’s publishes Market-Implied Ratings that 
incorporate the market price of default risk over time. 
28 See García and Prokopiw (2009) for discussion of credit-risk measures 
that may be useful for a central bank’s assessment of aggregate credit 
conditions.
The fi  nancial crisis exposed practices for managing 
market risk that negatively affected market dynamics 
and magnifi  ed the fl  uctuations in business cycles; i.e., 
procyclical practices. At the heart of these problems 
was the inherently procyclical nature of margining and 
haircut conventions.
29 In recognition of this phenom-
enon, policy-makers are considering measures to 
reduce the procyclicality caused by margining prac-
tices. These measures aim to dampen the buildup of 
leverage in good times and soften the systemic 
impact of subsequent deleveraging during downturns.
30
The fi  nancial crisis exposed practices 
for managing market risk that negatively 
affected market dynamics
and magnifi  ed the fl  uctuations
in business cycles
Against this backdrop, the Bank of Canada continu-
ously reviews its own approach to setting haircuts to 
ensure that its practices do not contribute to exces-
sive procyclicality and to better identify the central 
bank’s role in preventing and resolving liquidity-
induced crises. As a starting point, during periods of 
extraordinary fi  nancial system stress the central bank 
should place greater emphasis on its fi  nancial stability 
objective, avoiding any actions that could negatively 
reinforce funding-liquidity dynamics. This implies 
maintaining haircuts such that they are constant 
“through-the-cycle” (TTC), rather than varying them in 
response to short-term changes in risk measures. 
A TTC haircut would be based on a large sample of 
data that accounts for the risk-return characteristics 
of assets through a full price cycle that includes at 
least one crisis episode. Only periodic re-evaluation 
would be necessary to ensure that haircuts remain 
adequate in relation to the risk-tolerance level of the 
central bank. In a TTC approach, haircuts would not 
react to temporary spikes in liquidity premiums, but 
would refl  ect only fundamental credit and liquidity 
risks. However, decomposing a haircut into compen-
sation for credit risk, liquidity risk and a liquidity pre-
mium is not an easy undertaking, and further study is 
29 See Gorton and Metrick (2009), Kamhi (2009) and Krishnamurthy (2010) 
for a discussion of procyclical margining practices during the crisis.
30 See (CGFS 2010) for analysis of the linkages between margining and 
haircut practices and fi  nancial system procyclicality. 
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31 The Bank of Canada has committed to a 
research agenda aimed at better understanding these 
issues.
As post-crisis analyses and reforms continue, central 
banks may be in a position to consider how they can 
contribute to better margining practices. As the 
ultimate providers of liquidity, there may be a need for 
central banks to adjust their own haircut frameworks 
in order to limit procyclical dynamics and to ensure 




The fi  nancial system policy objectives of central banks 
gain attention during crisis periods, and central bank 
collateral policy can be used as part of the set of 
extraordinary measures taken by the public sector to 
stabilize the fi  nancial system. The central bank may 
need to accept riskier assets as collateral in the short 
term (applying appropriate risk controls), but the 
potential cost to the central bank is outweighed by the 
benefi  ts to the fi  nancial system. 
The preservation, on a limited scale, of certain collat-
eral-specifi  c measures introduced to address liquidity 
pressures during a crisis may also be justifi  ed. For 
example, the continued acceptance of a limited 
amount of non-conventional collateral during normal 
times can support the ability of market participants to 
manage their collateral, particularly in an environment 
where collateral-based fi  nancing is growing, and thus 
can promote well-functioning markets. It also sup-
ports the operational readiness of the central bank to 
address extraordinary events by increasing the eli-
gible amount of non-conventional collateral. 
This potential benefi  t must be balanced with con-
sideration for limiting moral hazard, however. By 
clearly communicating the uncertainty surrounding 
any changes to its collateral policy as they are intro-
duced during a crisis, and by reinforcing that extreme 
adjustments to that policy are specifi  c to rare and 
temporary conditions, there is less likelihood that the 
central bank’s counterparties will adversely change 
their behaviour. 
31 Given these challenges, the approach to date has been to calculate 
haircuts using a long historical sample and to hold them constant over 
an extended period.
32 This idea was put forward by Governor Carney as one of many 
considerations for adjusting monetary policy implementation as a 
means of promoting fi  nancial stability (Carney 2009).
At the same time, central bank collateral policy can 
help motivate positive changes to market behaviour, 
thus reducing the likelihood and intensity of a fi  nancial 
system shock in the future. Imposing transparency 
requirements for securitized products accepted as 
central bank collateral can encourage issuers to 
increase the quantity and quality of the information 
available to investors. Central banks can also help 
reduce mechanistic reliance on CRA ratings by 
ensuring that these are only part of a set of tools used 
to establish the creditworthiness of collateral for cen-
tral bank facilities. To the extent that practices for 
managing market risk take their cue from central bank 
collateral policy, central banks may be able to reduce 
the extent of procyclical margining practices by 
adopting through-the-cycle haircuts.
Conclusions
The recent fi  nancial crisis was widespread and 
demanded a coordinated global response. As policies 
and practices evolve in the aftermath of the crisis, 
coordination on a global basis will also be important. 
The sharing of analysis and experience will be helpful 
as central banks consider how best to shape their 
collateral policies, and many issues could be 
explored. For example: 
• The  benefi  ts of a fl  exible collateral policy were 
demonstrated during the crisis, but how fl  exible 
should collateral policies be? How much risk can 
or should a central bank take on? How can oper-
ational readiness to accommodate this fl  exibility be 
balanced with the costs, particularly when extra-
ordinary events are, by defi  nition, infrequent? 
•  To what extent should central bank collateral policy 
be used to motivate positive changes to market 
behaviour, and when should this be left to markets? 
Should central bank collateral policies be coordin-
ated in order to limit the potential for arbitrage? 
The Bank of Canada is open to engaging other central 
banks in examining these and other issues and will 
continue to review its collateral policy as one means 
of achieving its goals for monetary policy and the 
fi  nancial system.
43 
CENTRAL BANK COLLATERAL POLICY: INSIGHTS FROM RECENT EXPERIENCE
BANK OF CANADA REVIEW     SPRING 2011Literature Cited
European Central Bank. 2010. “ABS Loan-level 
Initiative.” Available at <http://www.ecb.int/paym/
coll/loanlevel/html/index.en.html >.
Financial Stability Board (FSB). 2010. “Principles for 
Reducing Reliance on CRA Ratings.” October 27.
Fontaine, J.-S., J. Selody and C. Wilkins. 2009. 
“Improving the Resilience of Core Funding 
Markets.” Bank of Canada Financial System 
Review (December): 41–46.
García, A. and A. Prokopiw. 2009. “Measures of 
Aggregate Credit Conditions and Their Potential 
Use by Central Banks.” Bank of Canada 
Discussion Paper No. 2009–12.
Gorton, G. and A. Metrick. 2009. “Haircuts.” NBER 
Working Paper No. 15273.
Harvey, N. and M. Merkowsky. 2008. “The Role of 
Credit Ratings in Managing Credit Risk in Federal 
Treasury Activities.” Bank of Canada Financial 
System Review (June): 61–66.
Hendry, S., S. Lavoie and C. Wilkins. 2010. 
“Securitized Products, Disclosure, and the 
Reduction of Systemic Risk.” Bank of Canada 
Financial System Review (June): 47–55.
International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2008. “Structured 
Finance: Issues of Valuation and Disclosure.” 
Global Financial Stability Report: Containing 
Systemic Risks and Restoring Financial 
Soundness, Chapter 2 (April): 54–85.
———. 2009. “Restarting Securitization Markets: 
Policy Proposals and Pitfalls.” Global Financial 
Stability Report: Navigating the Financial 
Challenges Ahead, Chapter 2 (October): 77–115.
Kamhi, N. 2009. “Procyclicality and Margin 
Requirements.” Bank of Canada Financial System 
Review (June): 55–57.
Kiff, J. 2010. “Reducing Role of Credit Ratings Would 
Aid Markets.” IMF Survey Magazine (September).
Krishnamurthy, A. 2010. “How Debt Markets H  ave 
Malfunctioned in the Crisis.” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 24(1): 3–28.
Lavoie, S., A. Sebastian and V. Traclet. 2011. “Lessons 
from the Use of Extraordinary Central Bank 
Liquidity Facilities.” Bank of Canada Review (this 
issue): 27–36.
Allan, D. and P. Bergevin. 2010. “The Canadian ABS 
Market: Where Do We Go From Here?” C.D. Howe 
Institute Commentary No. 315 (November).
Bank of Canada. 1999. “Year 2000 and Contingency 
Arrangements for the Provision of Liquidity by the 
Bank of Canada.” Press release, 2 September. 
Available at <http://www.bankofcanada.ca>.
———. 2008. “Proposed Criteria for Accepting ABCP 
as Collateral for the Bank of Canada’s Standing 
Liquidity Facility.” Announcement, 5 March. 
Available at <http://www.bankofcanada.ca>.
———. 2009. “Changes to Policy Regarding the 
Non-Mortgage Loan Portfolio as Collateral 
for the Bank of Canada’s Standing Liquidity 
Facility.” Notice, 5 November. Available at 
<http://www.bankofcanada.ca>.
Bank of England. 2010a. “Extending Eligible Collateral 
in the Discount Window Facility and Information 
Transparency for Asset-Backed Securitisations.” 
Available at: <http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/
markets/money/publications/condocmar10.pdf>.
———. 2010b. “Market Notice — Expanding Eligible 
Collateral in the Discount Window Facility and 
Information Transparency for Asset-Backed 
Securities.” Avalaible at: <http://www.bankofeng-
land.co.uk/markets/marketnotice100719.pdf>.
Carney, M. 2008. “Building Continuous Markets.” 
Remarks to the Canada-United Kingdom 
Chamber of Commerce, London, England,
19 November.
———. 2009. “Some Considerations on Using 
Monetary Policy to Stabilize Economic Activity.” 
Remarks to a symposium sponsored by the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Jackson 
Hole, Wyoming, 22 August.
Cecchetti, S. 2008. “Monetary Policy and the 
Financial Crisis of 2007–2008.” CEPR Policy 
Insight No. 21.
Committee on the Global Financial System (CGFS). 
2010. “The Role of Margin Requirements and 
Haircuts in Procyclicality.” CGFS Papers No. 36 
(March). 
Engert, W., J. Selody and C. Wilkins. 2008. “Financial 
Market Turmoil and Central Bank Intervention.” 
Bank of Canada Financial System Review
(June): 71–78.
44
CENTRAL BANK COLLATERAL POLICY: INSIGHTS FROM RECENT EXPERIENCE
BANK OF CANADA REVIEW     SPRING 2011Literature Cited (cont’d)
Selody, J. and E. Woodman. 2009. “Reform of 
Securitization.” Bank of Canada Financial System 
Review (December): 47—52.
Zorn, L., C. Wilkins and W. Engert. 2009. “Bank of 
Canada Liquidity Actions in Response to the 
Financial Market Turmoil.” Bank of Canada Review 
(Autumn): 3—22.
Paligorova, T. 2009. “Agency Confl  icts in the Process 
of Securitization.” Bank of Canada Review 
(Autumn): 33—47.
Selody, J. and C. Wilkins. 2010. “The Bank of 
Canada’s Extraordinary Liquidity Policies and 
Moral Hazard.” Bank of Canada Financial System 
Review (June): 29—32.
45 
CENTRAL BANK COLLATERAL POLICY: INSIGHTS FROM RECENT EXPERIENCE
BANK OF CANADA REVIEW     SPRING 2011